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Abstract
Novel coronavirus (named SARS-CoV-2) can spread widely in confined settings including
hospitals, cruise ships, prisons, and places of worship. In particular, a healthcare-associated
outbreak could become the epicenter of coronavirus disease (COVID-19). This study aimed
to evaluate the effects of different intervention strategies on the hospital outbreak within a
tertiary hospital. A mathematical model was developed for the COVID-19 transmission
within a 2500-bed tertiary hospital of South Korea. The SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infec-
tious-recovered) model with a compartment of doctor, nurse, patient, and caregiver was
constructed. The effects of different intervention strategies such as front door screening,
quarantine unit for newly admitted patients, early testing of suspected infected people, and
personal protective equipment for both medical staff and visitors were evaluated. The model
suggested that the early testing (within eight hours) of infected cases and monitoring the
quarantine ward for newly hospitalized patients are effective measures for decreasing the
incidence of COVID-19 within a hospital (81.3% and 70% decrease of number of incident
cases, respectively, during 60 days). Front door screening for detecting suspected cases
had only 42% effectiveness. Screening for prohibiting the admission of COVID-19 patients
was more effective than the measures for patients before emergency room or outpatient
clinic. This model suggests that under the assumed conditions, some effective measures
have a great influence on the incidence of COVID-19 within a hospital. The implementation
of the preventive measures could reduce the size of a hospital outbreak.
Introduction
In late December 2019, an outbreak of an emerging disease (COVID-19) due to a novel coro-
navirus named severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) originated in
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Wuhan, China and rapidly spread across China and beyond. This outbreak began from a sea-
food and live animals whole-sale market in Wuhan, but cases of patients suffering from the
infection have been documented both in hospital and in family settings [1]. People become
infected by respiratory droplets from coughing and talking but aerosol transmission is also
possible in cases of protracted exposure to elevated aerosol concentrations in closed spaces [2].
Transmission may occur indirectly through touching a contaminated surface, followed by
touching their eyes, nose, or mouth. The coronavirus may also be unexpectedly transmitted by
an asymptomatic carrier [3]. In fact, patients considered asymptomatic released large amounts
of viruses at the early phase of the infection, which posed enormous challenges to contain the
spread of COVID-19 [4], but 97.5% of patients with COVID-19 developed symptoms within
11.5 days [5].
Novel coronavirus can spread widely in confined settings, including hospitals, cruise ships,
prisons, and places of worship [6]. In particular, a healthcare-associated outbreak could
become the epicenter of COVID-19. Transmission in a hospital raises serious problems since
many immunocompromised and aged patients live together and an outbreak in a hospital
could paralyze its role of providing essential medical care within the healthcare system. There-
fore, effective strategies to contain COVID-19 outbreaks in hospitals are required [7]. How-
ever, even for a well-established hospital, coping with the unprecedented COVID-19 outbreak
would be a complex challenge.
In this study, we developed a mathematical compartment model to predict COVID-19




We divided individuals into four infection classes: susceptible, exposed, infectious, and
removed. (i.e., recovered, or otherwise no longer infectious). The susceptible, S, represents the
people who can be infected by SARS-CoV-2. The exposed, E, are those already infected but
who did not recognize the disease and even front door screening could not detect it. The infec-
tious, I, and removed, R, follow the usual immunizing infection [8].
The study hospital consists of three main categories: ward, outpatient clinic, and emergency
room. We divided people who entered the hospital into four main compartments: Doctor,
Nurse, Patient, and Caregiver. Doctors and nurses are a part of the medical staff who are fixed
in the hospital, while patients and caregivers are visitors who vary from day to day. We
assumed doctors work across departments while nurses work in their own departments.
Therefore, individuals in the hospital were divided into 10 statuses: doctors as a whole and
nurses, patients, and caregivers in each department (Fig 1).
Because there are three factors that divided the population, we represented the compart-
ment in the form of XYZ . X indicates 4 infection classes. Y is the occupation and Z represents
the department to which the component belongs. We used the notations D for the doctors’
group, N for the nurses’ group, P for patients’, and C for caregivers’. According to convention,
we denoted ADM as the ward, OPD for the outpatient department, and ER for the emergency
room. The component of WAIFW (Who-Acquires-Infection-From-Whom) matrix Wði;ikÞðj;jkÞ
represents the transmissibility from the (j,jk)-th infectious group to the (i,ik)-th susceptible
group, where the index (i,ik) indicates i-th occupation and ik-th department. Note that the
compartment for the doctors’ group does not have the subscript Z.
Y ¼ fD ¼ 1;N ¼ 2;P ¼ 3;C ¼ 4g
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Z ¼ fADM ¼ 1;OPD ¼ 2; ER ¼ 3g
Usually, the exposed person does not participate in the infection, but this is not clear in case
of COVID-19. Therefore, we assumed the exposed person is involved in the FOI (Force of














Public health authorities define a significant exposure to COVID-19 as face-to-face contact
with a symptomatic patient within six feet that is sustained for at least a few minutes. We esti-
mate the contact rate matrix, C, based on the short survey and employ the reproductive num-
ber, R0, from the literature. Setting the population vector η as the number of staff, and the
stabilized number of inflow and outflow to each department for visitors, we construct the
WAIFW matrix, W, by assuming that it is proportional to the contact rate matrix [8, 9]:
W ¼ qC
Fig 1. The diagram for the SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered) model with compartments of doctor, nurse, patient, and
caregiver. We assumed doctors work across departments while nurses work in their own departments; therefore, individuals in the hospital are
divided into 10 statuses. Blue arrows refer to the in- and out-flow of patients and caregivers in the OPD and ER, with only inbound arrows for
those in ADM. Abbreviations:—adm: admission; opd: outpatient department; er: emergency room.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169.g001
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The proportionality factor q represents the transmission risk per contact, which can be cal-
culated through the relation between WAIFW and R0.
q ¼
R0
rðC � ZÞðε=f þ 1=gÞ
Here f is the rate that at which the exposed becomes infectious, and the γ is the rate that the
infectious would recover. The population vector η denotes the number of staff, and the stabi-
lized number of inflow and outflow to each department for visitors and ρ(C�η) is the spectral
radius of the resulting matrix multiplying each row of C by corresponding element of η.
Fig 1 shows the diagram for the SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered) model with
compartments of doctor, nurse, patient, and caregiver. The patients and caregivers in OPD and
ER come in and out, but ADM does not have the inbound arrows, as we assumed that patients
are not directly admitted to the ward from the outside but only from other departments.
Average contact duration matrix indicates the average hours of contact in a day among
medical staff and visitors (Fig 2). The horizontal axis indicates the compartments having the
contacts and the vertical one indicates the compartments that are contacted. The matrix meets
the reciprocity of contacts which makes the contact rate matrix symmetric.
Study setting and ethics statement
The study site was Severance hospital, a tertiary care hospital with 2500 beds in South Korea.
There are 74 wards for inpatients within the study hospital, and we assumed each unit had the
same capacity of doctors and nurses. If two doctors work in a unit, there are 148 doctors work-
ing in wards daily. Other numbers based on epidemiology are shown in Table 1.
We retrieved data from the hospital administration department on the number of patients
who were admitted from the ER, hospitalized in wards, and had gone to outpatient clinics
from February 24, 2020 to March 13, 2020. The hospital administration department provided
us with the data without identifiable private information.
Fig 2. Average contact duration matrix indicating the average hours of contact in a day among medical staff and
visitors. The horizontal axis denotes the compartments with the contacts and the vertical one denotes the
compartments that are contacted. The matrix meets the reciprocity of contacts which makes the contact rate matrix
symmetric.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169.g002
PLOS ONE COVID-19 transmission model
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Before we began this study, we confirmed with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Sev-
erance Hospital that ethics approval was not needed, since we did not utilize any personal or
identifiable information of the patients. Authors who were affiliated to the hospital devised
parameters through anonymized data and work experience in the study site.
Parameters
At outpatient clinics, some patients are accompanied by caregivers, and we assumed half of
outpatients visit clinics with one caregiver. On the other hand, we assumed one caregiver was
assigned per patient in each ward and the emergency center as a hospital policy.
We arbitrarily assumed 10 exposed and 10 infectious people from the patient and caregiver
group came into the ER every three days, while the same number from the patient group and
half of them from the caregiver group came into the OPD every five days. We presumed they
had not been diagnosed by any reason when they entered the study hospital, which meant they
were not detectable with the known data.
All other parameters for the model are shown in Table 2.
Table 1. Number of hospital staff.
Department Occupation Number (persons)
OPD Doctors 194
Nurses 1300






Data are presented as number based on epidemiology of the study site.
Abbreviations: OPD: outpatient department; ER: emergency room.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169.t001
Table 2. The base parameter settings.
Parameter Symbol Value
Incubation Period [days]� 1/f 5.2
Infectious Period [days]� 1/γ 9.5
Impact of the exposed onto the infection× ε 0.1
The average inflow number of ADM from the outside per day† - 0
The average inflow number of OPD from the outside per day† - 11242.6
The average inflow number of ER from the outside per day† - 209.3
The average number from ER to ADM per day† - 51.4
The average number from OPD to ADM per day† - 314.6
The rate of outflow from the ADM [1/days]† - 0.1491
The rate of outflow from the OPD [1/days]† - 6
The rate of outflow from the ER [1/days]† - 4
� The incubation period and infectious period are from reference [13], [17]
× Rate at which the exposed persons become infectious
† An average of data collected from the hospital administration department in the study site
Abbreviation:—ADM: admission; OPD: outpatient department; ER: emergency room.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169.t002
PLOS ONE COVID-19 transmission model
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169 October 26, 2020 5 / 16
Intervention scenarios
The study site had implemented several controlling measures to prevent outbreaks within the
hospital (Table 3) but, in this mathematical model, we set up four intervention scenarios for
the model (Fig 3).
Front door screening. According to one study, on admission, 43.8% of COVID-19 patients
presented a fever, 67.8% a cough, and 33.7% with sputum [1]. The sensitivity is the test’s ability to
correctly designate a subject with the disease as positive, and we calculated the sensitivity of front
door screening at 0.5. However, if we sought an epidemiologic relationship to confirmed patients
or travel history along with their current symptoms, the sensitivity would increase, which we
assumed at 0.7. Front door screening was performed on visitors of three different departments:
AMD, OPD, and ER.
Quarantine unit for newly admitted patients. Even though the study hospital executed a
pneumonia preemptive isolation unit, asymptomatic patients (usually in the exposed group)
could be missed in this control. Therefore, we assumed all patients who were admitted either
from the ER or outpatient clinics were sent to a quarantine unit for two weeks.
Early testing (within eight hours) of suspected people to detect the disease. We
assumed the average time for diagnosis would be eight hours. As COVID-19 patients in the
hospital were confirmed, they were directed to isolated rooms (the removed group). As medi-
cal staff were aware of the clinical symptoms of COVID-19 and patients’ medical conditions
were regularly and closely monitored, the groups were immediately tested when the related
symptoms occurred. However, caregivers were not as attentive as patients were; therefore, we
assumed they were tested three days later than other groups.
Personal protective equipment for both medical staff and visitors. The regulation of
the study hospital specifies that all people in the hospital are required to wear masks. Since
SARS-CoV-2 is a respiratory virus like other coronaviruses or influenza, facial masks signifi-
cantly reduce transmission of human coronavirus from symptomatic individuals, which could
be a way to control of COVID-19 [10]. However, because the chance of catching COVID-19
Table 3. Control measures to prevent COVID-19 outbreak in the study site.
Measures Description
Front door screening Fever screening with thermometer and infrared camera
Inquiring about contact history and related symptoms (cough, sputum, sore
throat) by a standard checklist
Triage clinics for high risk group Separate clinics for persons who have either fever or respiratory illness, and
who have a history of traveling abroad or visiting high risk areas, located in
front of the entrance to the outpatient clinic and emergency room.
Access control The study site minimized the number of entrances to hospital buildings and
restrict visiting to admitted patients
Universal mask wearing All healthcare workers, employees, patients, and visitors are obligated to wear
masks in the hospital
Increasing diagnostic capability
for COVID-19
Real-time Reverse Transcription Polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) for any
patients with related symptoms or suspected findings without specific causes
The frequency of real-time RT PCR testing to diagnose COVID-19 in the
study hospital has increased from 1 time/day to 6 times/day during COVID-19
outbreak since January 2020
The test results could be reported within four hours
Pneumonia preemptive isolation
ward
Isolation ward with negative pressure isolation rooms in operation
Patients with either fever or pneumonia were preemptively isolated and
treated within the ward
Healthcare workers for those patients are required to wear appropriate
personal protective equipment (PPE).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169.t003
PLOS ONE COVID-19 transmission model
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from a passing interaction in a public space is minimal, some people raise the question of effec-
tiveness of universal use of masks by all healthcare workers and visitors [11]. However, the
effect of face masks, respirators and eye protection that result in reducing risk of outbreak had
been verified [12]. We assumed the protection rate of transmission by masks would be 0.3, and
the protection rates could reach 0.3, 0.6, or 0.9 as reinforcing personal protective equipment
(PPE) with gloves, gowns, eye protection, etc.
Fig 3 shows the above interventions diagrammatically.
Sensitivity analysis
Reproductive number. The vulnerability of results for each intervention required check-
ing as the reproductive number varied since we set the WAIFW matrix from it. We employed
Fig 3. Intervention scenario. (A), Infectious class in SEIR diagram; green arrows indicate front door screening and brown arrows indicate testing the infectious
patients. Front door screening intervenes the inflow of the infectious patients and the tested patients are removed at the rate of 1/t. As we described, we assumed
caregivers are tested three days later than other groups. (B), WAIFW diagram of each group; pink arrows indicate reduction of transmission by wearing a universal mask
while red arrows are reinforcement of the protection device among medical staff. Reinforcing the protection device among medical staff reduces the probability of
transmission as in red arrows. (C), Diagram for pre-isolating the patients who are to be admitted, which we named the quarantine unit. Patients are usually admitted
from OPD and ER (light gray arrows), but if all patients are directed to the isolated ward (iso) (dark gray arrow), isolated people are out of the dynamics for 14 days.
Abbreviations:—adm: admission; opd, outpatient department; er: emergency room; iso: quarantine unit.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169.g003
PLOS ONE COVID-19 transmission model
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the value 2.2 from the paper for early transmission analysis of COVID-19 in Wuhan [13].
However, over time, many studies have been performed regarding an estimation of the repro-
ductive number in different circumstances with control measures [14, 15]. Variability must be
taken into consideration within the range of reproductive numbers for evaluating each inter-
vention. Therefore, we also simulated the impact of our interventions in case of a very high
reproductive number (6.47) [14].
Incubation period and serial interval. The incubation period has not been determined
yet and we set it at 5.2 days [13] as a base case and 6.4 days [16] for sensitivity analysis. The
serial interval has not been determined and we assumed 9.5 days [17] and 4.6 days for sensitiv-
ity, which is 2 times of 2.3 days–that is the difference between 7.5 days serial interval and 5.2
days incubation period [13]. Note that these parameter values were to be fitted with different
assumptions for distribution. However, in an average sense, they have few differences with
other fitting results and can be used as parameters in our model. With these parameters, we set
the base-, worst-, and best-case scenarios and performed the sensitivity analysis with them
(See Table 4).
Results
The dynamics of COVID-19 transmission without any intervention
The model simulated the epidemic curve of COVID-19 in the study site with base parameters.
Fig 4 shows the daily new incidence of COVID-19 without any intervention for 60 days. The
horizontal axis represents time (days) and the vertical axis indicates the number of people who
are newly confirmed patients within the past 24 hours. This predicts daily new cases of infected
people from four compartments over time within the hospital. Since doctors work across
departments, their epidemic is shown in Fig 4A. Other groups work or stay in separate depart-
ments, which indicate different epidemics (Fig 4B). The infected cases in ER and OPD are very
small due to relative short duration of stay and low reproductive number, so the spread is
Table 4. Parameter values for evaluation of various interventions and sensitivity analysis�.
Scenario Parameter Set Source
Base 1/f† 5.2 [13]
1/γ‡ 9.5 [17]
R0§ 2.2 [13]
Best 1/f 6.4 [16]
1/γ 9.5 [17]
R0 2.2 [13]
Worst 1/f 5.2 [13]
1/γ 4.6 [18]
R0 6.47 [14]
� We set the best- and worst-case scenario parameter sets in terms of curbing viral transmission. If the virus has a
long infectious period and low reproductive number, the transmissibility is low, which is helpful in curbing the
spread of disease. On the other hand, with a short infectious period and high reproductive number, it would lead to
high transmissibility even in a restricted condition.
† 1/f is the incubation period; a reversal of the rate at which the exposed patients become infectious
‡ 1/γ denotes the infectious period, a reversal of the rate at which the infectious patients would recover
§ R0 denotes the reproductive number, an average number of secondary cases generated by a case in an entirely
susceptible population.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169.t004
PLOS ONE COVID-19 transmission model
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169 October 26, 2020 8 / 16
restricted and there is no remarkable outbreak in the ER or OPD. However, when confirmed
cases are in wards, they become more transmissible since visitors have a high contact duration
matrix within the group. Fig 5 indicates total epidemic curves of COVID-19. The number of
the exposed and infectious people among visitors grows in the early period but this reaches a
Fig 4. Daily new incidence of COVID-19. (A) Epidemics in doctor status. (B), Epidemics in 10 statuses; from top to
bottom, ADM, OPD, ER. Abbreviations:—ADM: admission; OPD: outpatient department; ER: emergency room.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169.g004
PLOS ONE COVID-19 transmission model
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plateau. The curve of the recovered patients represents a trend of a totally susceptible popula-
tion in the hospital before the ourbreak being immune to the disease. The total number of
infectious people is about 30 at the end of the dynamics.
The effects of various interventions
Next, we simulated the model with various interventions. We set the sum of new incidence for
60 days as an outcome measure. “1- effectiveness of an intervention (%)” is defined as the ratio
of the outcome with an intervention to one without any intervention, so effectiveness denotes
the proportion of decrease of the confirmed cases due to an intervention. Fig 6 shows the effec-
tiveness of all intervention scenarios and the effectiveness of the detection of infectious
patients, 80.7%, is the highest among the control measures. Therefore, an examination of any
suspected cases is the most important way to prevent an outbreak in the hospital. Wearing uni-
versal masks by medical staff and visitors (see PPE DN 0.3 PC 0.3 in Fig 6) shows about 66.4%
of effectiveness. The impact of different protection rates of medical staff tested by three scenar-
ios (0.3, 0.6, or 0.9) turned out to be insignificant (66.4%, 67.8%, or 68.9%, respectively). In
other words, reinforcement of PPE for medical staff does not show an expected improvement
of effectiveness. Quarantine of new hospitalized patients is another effective way to prevent
outbreaks. The quarantine unit is as effective as 65.7%, while front door screening shows less
effectiveness, which is up to 43.1%. The screening of patients who are admitted to the ward is
the most effective method, followed by ER and OPD (30.7%, 28.7%, and 2.2% with sensitivity
of screening of 0.5). As expected, the more accurate the screening is, the more effective it is as
a control measure. If the sensitivity of screening is 0.7, the effectiveness of front door screening
for inward, ER, and OPD is 43.1%, 40.1%, and 3.3%, respectively. According to our mathemat-
ical model, screening of an OPD is not a good measure to prevent an outbreak in a hospital
setting.
Fig 5. Total epidemic curve of COVID-19. The curve of the recovered patients represents a trend of totally
susceptible population in the hospital before the outbreak being immune to the disease.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169.g005
PLOS ONE COVID-19 transmission model
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Sensitivity analysis
We performed a sensitivity analysis by taking various combinations of parameter values based
on plausible ranges. The worst-case scenario has a short incubation period and high reproduc-
tive number, resulting in the biggest outbreak in the hospital. On the other hand, the reverse
combination yields the best-case scenario. First, we estimated the outbreak in our hospital in
the absence of control measures, which is shown in Fig 7 with sensitivity analysis. The exposed
people in the worst-case scenario (Fig 7B) rises to a peak of 902 people, while the exposed peo-
ple in the best-case scenario (Fig 7A) only reaches 30 people. A highly transmissible case is
hard to control with an exponentially increasing number of exposed and infectious patients.
Additionally, we evaluated the effectiveness of different interventions in three scenarios:
base, best, and worst cases (Fig 8). The effectiveness of control is higher in the best-case sce-
nario through front door screening and use of a quarantine unit. Screening of inpatients
through front door screening with a sensitivity of 0.7 shows effectiveness of 44.0% and 6.6% in
best- and worst-case scenarios, respectively. Regarding the ER, the effectiveness is 41.3% in the
best-case scenario and 5.6% in the worst-case scenario. Effectiveness is about seven times
higher in front door screening of admission wards and ERs without reference to sensitivity of
Fig 6. Effectiveness of all intervention scenarios. Effectiveness denotes the proportion of decrease of the confirmed cases due to an
intervention. We assume the sensitivity of front door screening of 0.5 or 0.7 and the protection rates possibly becoming 0.3, 0.6, or 0.9 as
reinforcing protection device. Abbreviations:—PPE: personal protective equipment; DN: doctors and nurses; PC: patients and caregivers; ADM:
admission; OPD: outpatient department; ER: emergency room.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169.g006
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screening. In a low transmission setting, it is crucial to detect the patients with COVID-19
from ER and in wards before inflow to a hospital. A quarantine unit also helps prevent the
outbreak in the hospital more in the best-case scenario than in the worst (64.1% vs 52.6%). A
high transmission rate in the hospital offsets the effort of screening of infectious patients and
Fig 7. Sensitivity analysis of epidemic curves in the (A) best-case scenario; and, (B) worst-case scenario. The worst-case
scenario has a short incubation period and a high reproductive number, resulting in the biggest outbreak in the hospital.
On the other hand, the reverse combination yields the best-case scenario.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169.g007
PLOS ONE COVID-19 transmission model
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the short incubation period decreases the efficacy of the quarantine of newly hospitalized
patients.
On the other hand, the probability of control by testing and protection devices is higher in
worst-case scenarios. PPE reinforcement decreases transmission effectively in highly transmis-
sible conditions, which contributes to reducing the outbreak as with the worst-case scenario.
Strengthening protection has little impact on the new incidence of confirmed cases in sensitiv-
ity analysis. Testing to detect and isolate confirmed cases is also more important in higher
transmission cases (92.3%). Sensitivity analysis shows diagnosis of the disease within eight
hours and isolation is still the best intervention strategy in a hospital.
Discussion
Since the global outbreak of COVID-19, many control measures have been implemented to try
and contain the pandemic: isolation of confirmed and suspected cases; contact tracing; social
distancing; and, travel restrictions. Suggestion of best strategies which offer greater benefits is
difficult in the context of an epidemic. Several mathematical models have been proposed to
explain the system and help decision making beyond hospital settings [19–22]. One study
explored the spatial association of the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in China [23].
A dynamic mathematical model estimated that the growth rate of COVID-19 is about twice
that of the SARS and MERS, and the doubling cycle is two to three days without intervention
[24]. A stochastic transmission model assessed the potential for transmission in locations out-
side Wuhan, if cases were introduced. It calculated that once there are at least four indepen-
dently introduced cases, there is a more than a 50% chance that the infection will establish
itself within that population [25].
Fig 8. Effectiveness of control measures in three scenarios: Base, best, and worst. Sensitivity analysis shows
diagnosis of the disease within eight hours and isolation is still the best intervention in the hospital. The effectiveness of
front door screening and the quarantine unit is higher in the best-case scenario, with that of protection device and
testing higher in the worst-case scenario. Abbreviations:—PPE: personal protective equipment; DM: doctors and
nurses; PC: patients and caregivers; ADM: admission; OPD: outpatient department; ER: emergency room.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241169.g008
PLOS ONE COVID-19 transmission model
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In this study, we simplified the transmission of COVID-19 in a hospital to construct a math-
ematical model that would enable us to estimate the outbreak and determine the effectiveness of
control measures. We conducted a sensitivity analysis with different assumptions because of the
uncertainty of the parameters. Early testing of infected cases and monitoring the quarantine
ward for newly hospitalized patients are effective ways to minimize the COVID-19 outbreak
within a hospital. Detecting the patients with COVID-19 from the ER and in wards before
inflow to a hospital is effective in low transmission settings; PPE is important to control trans-
missibility in high transmission settings. Our results could expand to many interventions imple-
mented in society. In high transmissible and short latent cases, transmission reduction
interventions including wearing universal masks are more important than restriction of inflow
of patients by screening and isolating suspected cases. Above all, quarantine and isolation effi-
cacy should be increased by means of proper hygiene and personal protection.
To our knowledge, this study is the first model to estimate the epidemics in a hospital and
evaluate the effects of control measures for COVID-19. Other studies about hospital outbreaks
from infectious diseases were conducted with many different mathematical models: a multi-
agent model or SEIR transmission model [26–29]. In the case of MERS-CoV, the emergency
departments exercised great influence over the epidemic size for both patients and healthcare
workers, and isolation and related strict measures (added PPE or environmental sanitation)
suppressed the epidemics with the help of the SEIR compartmental model [26]. The SEIR com-
partmental model was similar to our model, which is deterministic, multi-type, and spatial in a
hospital setting. Our model set the reproductive number with sensitivity analysis, assumed the
regular inflow of COVID-19 patients to a hospital, and compared the control measures.
There are some limitations of this model. Our model does not include people who enter the
hospital and do not belong to the four occupations specified (doctors, nurses, patients, and
caregivers). Weekends, when most of the medical staff are off duty were not taken into consid-
eration. Various units and situations of the hospital have not been included in this model, such
as the intensive care unit, operation room, and confirmed cases of medical staff. While the
model assumes the same inflow of exposed and infectious people from the patient and care-
giver group, the prevalence of asymptomatic infection has not been clarified yet. We set the
rate at which the exposed individuals become infectious at 0.1, which has also not been con-
firmed. In addition, we assumed that the sensitivity of the front door screening is low (0.5 or
0.7) and detects only infectious persons; however, thorough checklists and use of thermome-
ters might detect more infectious or exposed people. Therefore, it is cautious to assert that
front door screening is effortless. More studies should be conducted on the outbreak and con-
trol measures from different perspectives. Even though we did not include all the details, this
study could improve our insights into epidemiological situations and identify which control
measures are most efficacious in hospital settings. Though this study was confined to one hos-
pital, it can be tailored to the requirements of other hospitals, facilitating effective hospital-
based management during this rapidly evolving outbreak.
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